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Abstract- The Interna! Revenue Service-a sub-agency that exists
to collect revenue-has the task of administering and enforcing a
wide array of social policy: from subsidies Jor college and child care
expenses, to creating jobs in depressed areas, and assisting welfare
recipients with employment. While these new or expanded credits
represent a new paradigm in the delivery of social policy, little is
known about who uses these programs and, equally important, who
does not use these programs. Understanding utilization is a key to
understanding how effective this means of transferring income is
and whether we are reaching the targeted populations. This paper
provides a Jramework Jor thinking about utilization of tax credits
among low-income individuals, supported by existing research on
credit utilization.
With the existing data, it appears that utilization is by Jar
the largest Jor the EITC, possibly because it is the oldest of these
programs, the only refundable program, and the best targeted at
low-income individuals. Utilization is low among low-income
individuals in sorne tax credits because low-income individuals
are not eligible. A redesign, including reducing complexity and
administrative burdens or making these programs refundable,
would result in the programs reaching those that they are ostensibly
targeted towards.
Conditional on being eligible, one common factor associated with
increasing participation in many of these programs is a high benefit
to cost ratio and sophistication with the tax system, whether that
be through the use of a paid preparer, higher education levels, or
experience with the tax system. Policymakers should think creatively
about reducing filing burdens to increase participation, such as
through wider use of electronic filing.
This is our objective-to give you the broad-based tax relief
you deserve-to cut taxes, to increase access to health insurance, and to make education more affordable. 1can think of no
goals that are more important as we look to provide for our
families and to prepare America for a bright and prosperous
new millennium.
-William V. Roth, Jr. (R-DE),
Senate Finance Committee Chairman, July 9, 1999
The Wootens of Salt Lake City are one of perhaps many lowincome farnilies who probably would have not filed for the
Earned Income Tax Credit had nota tax preparer alerted them to
it. "We were absolutely shocked that this was available," Becky
Wooten said. There is evidence that many low-income farnilies,
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of transferring income is and whether we
are reaching the targeted populations.
Utilization may be low among eligible
taxpayers, suggesting that the goals of
the programs are going unmet, or high
among ineligible taxpayers, suggesting
that government funds are being used
in an unintended way. From a practica!
standpoint, understanding utilization
helps predict current and future costs of
programs, especially when programs are
reauthorized on a regular basis.
The goal of this paper is to provide a
framework for thinking about utilization
of tax credits among low-income individuals, supported by existing research
on credit utilization. In the second section,
we broadly consider issues of measuring
utilization and participation decisions
among targeted, eligible and ineligible
taxpayers. In the following two sections,
we take the framework and apply it to a
review of what we know about utilization
in credits for individual taxpayers (third
section) and employers (fourth section).
One important contribution in these sections is to identify the credits that target
low-income individuals, which is not always explicitly obvious from the statutory
law. The shift in the provision of social
programs through the tax system leads us
to the fifth section, which draws upon the
lessons of utilization learned from the welfare system. With all of that background,
the sixth section considers what utilization should look like and suggests means
of achieving that level of utilization. The
seventh section concludes.

like the Wootens, do not participa te in the
EITC and similar targeted tax credits that
another EITC recipient says, "makes a
huge difference for our family."
-Lesley Mitchell,
"Free Money Unclaimed,"
Salt Lake City Tribune, February 13, 2005.
INTRODUCTION

he political tension between embracing social programs yet disdaining the
size of government has forced politicians
to find unique ways to appeal to voters
interested in new spending programs
while reducing federal spending and
taxes. "Tax relief" is a familiar chorus, as
politicians promote new proposals not
through direct spending programs, as was
done in the heyday of the Great Society,
but through tax programs. Perhaps it is no
surprise that, in the name of tax relief, the
Interna! Revenue Service-a sub-agency
that exists to collect revenue--has the task
of administering and enforcing a wide
array of social policy: from subsidies for
college and child care expenses, to creating jobs in depressed areas, and assisting
welfare recipients with employment. The
recent "Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act
of 2005" highlights the significance of
these tax credits; the law outlines special
provisions to two of the tax credits specifically targeted at low-income individuals
as a means of relief for hurricane victims
(U.S. Congress, 2005). 1 While these new
or expanded programs represent a new
paradigrn in the delivery of social policy,
little is known about who uses these programs and, equally important, who does
not use these programs.
Understanding utilization is a key to
understanding how effective this means

T

1

UTILIZATION

Before proceeding to the research on
utilization, we begin by laying out a
framework of conceptual and practica!

The bill allows qualified individuals to calculate their eamed income tax credit and refundable child credit for
the 2005 tax year if they reside in qualified areas and their eamed income in 2005 is below their 2004 eamed
income. In addition, employers may claim the Work Opportunity Tax Credit for employees whose principal
.abode was in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area as of August 28, 2005.
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parameters of the tax credit. That is, sorne
low-income individuals may not receive
the credit beca use they are ineligible due
to insufficient income or lack of a categorical requirement such as children or
qualifying expenses. This source of low
participation rates may reflect program
design to keep the costs of the credits low
or very well-targeted. Low participation
rates among low-income individuals may
also reflecta failure of the credit to encourage intended behaviors, such as savings
or education, because the requirements
are too costly for low-income individuals to attain. The measure of utilization
where the recipients are normalized by
a measure of the low-income population
also includes individuals who choose
not to participate because the benefits of
claiming the credit (reduced tax liability
or refund from the IRS) exceed the cost
of filing the credit (transaction costs associated with gaining information about
the credit and filing the taxes, and stigma
costs). 2 Policy parameters have the ability
to affect this source of non-particpa tion. If
the benefits of the credit are greater than
the costs of filing to individuals outside
the targeted population, intentional noncompliance with the credit will increase
this measure of utilization. Complex rules
may cause unintentional non-compliance
that is also captured in this broad measure
of credit utilization.
Understanding the sources of participation and non-participation are significant
for designing well-targeted credits and
policies aimed at increasing utilization.
For that reason, an additional measure
of utilization is helpful-participation
among the populations eligible for the
credit. Empirical identification of the
eligible population fully characterizes
the scope of the targeted population and
provides insights into how well a tax
credit is designed to meet the needs of
the low-income population. Combining

issues confronted in the literature. One
straightforward measure of utilization
among low-income individuals is the
number of recipients and the credit dollars received. These measures show the
scope and cost of the program at a basic
level and reflect changes in tax policy and
environments over time.
Further measures of utilization address whether the income tax credits are
targeted at low-income individuals. The
tax credit parameters answer part of this.
Presumably, policymakers set parameters
for the targeted population in an effort
to meet a set of policy goals, such as increased equity, employment, savings or
education, while also considering budgetary concems. To meet these goals, the tax
credits have a set of categorical requirements that include: number of children,
amount of savings, amount and type
of education spending, welfare receipt
status, economic status of county of residence, and work hours. Eligibility is also
typically based on the income of the tax
unit, again in an effort to help meet equity
and/ or budgetary goals. The credit may
require that income is below a threshold
at which point the credit is phased out to
zero. In addition, most credits are nonrefundable, such that taxpayers must have
a mínimum amount of income to have
tax liability for the credit to offset. The
design of the credit defines the targeted
population. In practice, a measure of utilization that addresses whether the credit
targets low-income taxpayers, relative to
higher-income taxpayers, is the share of
the credit received by low-income taxpayers. However, this measure does not measure how widespread credit utilization is
among low-income taxpayers.
Normalizing the number of lowincome claimants by a measure of the
low income population identifies how
intensely low-income individuals use a
credit. Again, this will partly reflect the
2

See Moffitt (1983) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for models of stigma, tax compliance and filing.
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participation decisions with information
on eligibility provides information about
whether the targeted group actually receives the credit. Conditional on meeting
the categorical and income requirements,
the targeted population may not receive
the credits if they do not file taxes or
claim the credit or their employer does
not claim on their behalf. In contrast,
identifying ineligible taxpayers who claim
the credit sheds light on the personal and
credit characteristics that influence noncompliance.
We have been purposely vague when
talking about the population of lowincome individuals used to normalize
the number of credit recipients, since the
choice of population provides answers
to different questions. Specifically, normalizing by only low-income taxpayers
is useful for understanding how existing
tax filers naviga te the income tax system.
In contrast, using the entire low-income
population provides a baseline for considering the pool of potential tax-filers.
These potential tax-filers may include
those currently relying on the welfare
system, whom tax credits are designed
to encourage into the labor force. A second issue when defining the population
is whether to consider participation and
eligibility over a single year or multiple
years. When considering how well targeted the credits are, "lifetime" measures
may be more relevant. Multiple years also
allow straightforward measurements of
whether the tax credits encourage the
intended behaviors.
The data demands for estimating
eligibility and, therefore, utilization are
formidable and much of the research
presented in the following sections reflects
compromises. In fact, the choices of how
to normalize the measures of utilization,
described conceptually above, are often
3

made because of data constraints. While
administrative data may provide precise
estimates of the number of taxpayers
claiming the credits, it often lacks the
demographic and financia! information
about the tax unit to determine eligibility. Of course, not everyone files taxes
and so administrative data provides no
information on the eligible who do not
file. Survey data, which is often selfreported, may provide essential details
for calculating eligibility, such as income
or spending behavior, and income tax
decisions. However, the accuracy of these
data is often questionable, particularly
given the complexity of the tax system.
The two data sources are rarely linked,
which requires creativity in estimating
participation rates.
The following sections address whether
the credits are targeted at low-income
individuals, describe utilization of credits
among this group and consider the findings of researchers who confront measuring utilization. As a caveat, we note that
utilization, the focus of this paper, is only
a first step in evaluating the effectiveness
of tax credits for low-income individuals.
A complete evaluation of effectiveness
would include a consideration of the economic incidence of the credits, but that is
beyond the scope of this paper.
PERSONAL INCOME TAX CREDITSDESCRIPTION AND UTILIZATION3

Earned lncome Tax Credit

Description
The federal Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) originated in 1975 to encourage
work, reduce unemployment and welfare
caseloads, and to ease the burden of social
security and self-employment taxes paid
by low-income individuals with children

Appendix Table 1Asummarizes the research on each personal income tax credit we consider. We do not directly
address the child tax credit, adoption credit or elderly tax credit because they do not directly address social
goals beyond, perhaps, equity and there is very little research on the utilization of these credits.
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(Ventry, 2000). The structure of the EITC
makes it clearly targeted at lower-income individuals. Specifically, the EITC
is refundable and available to taxpayers
with earnings below a threshold that
varies based on family size and marital
status. The current EITC has three regions,
which vary based on a taxpayer's marital
status and number of children: a phase-in
region, which supplements earnings at a
rate of7.64 percent for childless taxpayers,
34.0 percent for taxpayers with one child,
and 40.0 percent for taxpayers with two
or more children; a platea u region, which
provides a constant subsidy for earnings;
anda phaseout region, which reduces the
credit ata rate of 7.64 percent for childless
taxpayers, 15.98 percent for taxpayers
with one child, and 21.06 percent for taxpayers with two or more children. In the
2005 tax year, taxpayers with earnings up
to $35,263 can qualify for an EITC.
Figure 1.
Year

Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the value of
the EITC for three hypothetical households at various income levels: joint filer
with two children, head-of-household
filer with one child, and a single filer. The
figures highlight features that make the
credit well targeted at low-income individuals: the credit is essentially phased
out before the median income and the
refundability of the credit implies that
taxpayers with income below the tax
threshold are eligible for the maximum
credit.
In order to claim the credit, a taxpayer
must fill out a two-page schedule EIC to
identify their dependent child(ren). The
instructions for calculating the 2004 EITC
in the 1040 formare seven pages long, plus
the tax tables for calculating the value
of the credit (IRS, 2004a; IRS, 2004c). In
addition, a 55-page IRS publication 596
describes the EITC.

Ranges of Credits for Rep resentative Married Filing Jointly, 2-Child H ouseh old, 2004 Tax

sooo .,..-------~§=~ ~ ~--~ ~----------------!! -~
4SOO

u:a~
···· · · · · · ~· ll2..,'
o.. -

-~~
. - ~·ooe-

~~

.. ~~

e·~ .
M

jo

f-

.. ij·l

4000

~:ll

JSOO

§ 3000

!
~

2SOO

2000

HopeCredit

ISOO
1000

soo

lnoome

Notes: Assumes the taxpayer uses the standard deduction, no other deductions or exclusions, and the alterna ti ve
minimum tax does not apply. Assumes the taxpayer uses the maximum expenses and meets al! other eligibility
criteria for each credit. Chart reflects that non-refundable credits are limited by tax liability, the refundable portion
of the Child Tax Credit, and the phaseout of the education credits. The cited figure of Married Household refer to
Married Couple Householder. 10th lncome Percentile and 20th lncome Percentile refer to all households.
Sources: Census (2005) and authors' calculations from various IRS publications.
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Figure 2.

Ranges of Credits for Representative Head-{)f-Household Filing, 1-Child Household,
2004 Tax Year
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Notes: Assumes the taxpayer uses the standard deduction, no other deductions or exclusions, and the alternative
minimum tax does not apply. Assumes the taxpayer uses the maxirnum expenses and meets all other eligibility criteria for each credit. Chart reflects that non-refundable credits are limited by tax liability, the refundable
portion of the Child Tax Credit, and the phaseout of the education credits. The cited figures refer to MaJe and
Female Householders with no spouse present. The 10th income percentile and 20th income percentile refers to
all households.
Sources: Census (2005) and authors' calculations from various IRS publications.

(http: 11www.sfgov.org 1si te 1wfc_index.
asp?id=29174).

The EITC is not only the largest cash
transfer program, with an estimated
cost of $33 billion in the 2004 fiscal year,
but it is also perhaps the best-known
and best-studied tax credit targeted at
lower-income individuals (OMB, 2005).
Since its inception, the federal EITC has
greatly expanded in size and scope, mechanically increasing the number of eligible individuals. Additionally, 15 states,
and the District of Columbia, currently
operate their own EITCs based directly
off the federal EITC or with similar features to the federal EITC. 4 At least one
city, San Francisco, also offers an EITC
'

Utilization Among Low-lncome lndividuals

Estima tes
In practice, Tables 1 and 2 show that
100 percent of the taxpayers receiving the
EITC have adjusted gross income (AGI)
below $40,000, an income that represents
less than two-thirds of all taxpayers. In
fact, in early years, when the nominal
income cut off for the EITC was lower,
almost all recipients had income under
$25,000. Note that between 40.9 percent in
1995 and 26.3 percent in 2002 of all EITC

Illinois, Indiana, lowa, !<ansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin have state eamed income tax credits. Colorado also has a credit, but
it is available only in the years when the budget is not in deficit. Virginia will begin a program in 2006.
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Figure 3.

Ranges of Credits for Representative Single Filer, No-Children Household, 2004 Tax Year
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Notes: Assumes the taxpayer uses the standard deduction, no other deductions or exclusions, and the altemative
minimum tax does not apply. Assumes the taxpayer uses the maximum expenses and meets all other eligibility
criteria for each credit. Chart reflects that non-refundable credits are limited by tax liability and the phaseout of
the education credits. The cited figures refer to Male and Female Householders with no spouse present; lncome
Percentile refer to all households.
Sources: Census (2005) and authors' calculations from various IRS publications.

recipients reported fewer than $10,000 in
AGI, representing 47.3 to 36.5 percent of
all EITC returns, respectively.
There is limited evidence of the dynamics of EITC usage and the work underscores sorne of the complicated data issues
in measuring utilization. Dowd (2005), in
this volume, uses a sample of taxpayers
with a child and under 65 years old from
the 1989 to 2003 Continuous Work History
Sample. With this very select sample of

the potentially important role of lowincome individuals moving in and out of
the income tax system. Horowitz (2002)
estimates EITC eligibility in the 1975 to
1992 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). In sharp contrast to Dowd (2005),
there is no information on actual EITC
utilization, however Horowitz shows the
average EITC-eligible-spelllength is 3.55
years and there is a high recidivism rate
in eligibility (31 percent after two years

taxpayers who filed taxes for alllS years

of ineligibility).

in the sample, he finds that the probability of claiming the credit at least once is
28 percent. Conditional on claiming the
credit at least once, almost half of this
15-year sample receives the credit for
three or fewer years. Among taxpayers
who were in the data for at least three
consecutive years, Dowd (2005) finds evidence of persistence in claiming the EITC.
Taxpayer data alone obviously misses

Several studies of the EITC focus on
participation among the eligible population, with most concluding that more
than three-quarters of eligible households
claim the credit. In widely cited estimates,
Scholz (1994) matched information from
tax returns to data from the 1990 Survey
of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) and estimated that most likely
between 80 and 86 percent of eligible
749
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TABLEl
SHARES OF CREDIT RETURNS BY INCOME
YEAR

AGIRANGE

;ji

o

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Eamed Income Tax Credit
Under $10,000
$10,000 under $25,000
$25,000 under $40,000
$40,000 and over
Total Returns

47.3%
51.1%
1.5%
0.0%
19,334,395

46.6%
49.8%
3.6%
0.0%
19,463,835

43.9%
51.8%
4.4%
0.0%
19,391,177

42.5%
51.0%
6.5%
0.0%
19,704,708

41.2%
51.1%
7.8%
0.0%
19,258,717

40.1%
50.9%
9.1%
0.0%
19,277,223

38.7%
50.4%
10.9%
0.0%
19,593,122

36.5%
48.9%
14.6%
0.0%
21,703,189

Oúld Care Credit
Under $10,000
$10,000 under $25,000
$25,000 under $40,000
$40,000 and over
Total Returns

0.1%
21.6%
24.5%
53.9%
5,964,251

0.1%
21.0%
23.4%
55.5%
5,974,147

0.1%
19.4%
20.3%
60.2%
5,795,532

0.1%
17.2%
21.0%
61.7%
6,128,156

0.0%
14.9%
19.9%
65.2%
6,182,192

0.0%
14.1%
19.5%
66.4%
6,368,100

0.0%
14.1%
19.3%
66.6%
6,184,506

0.0%
14.7%
20.1%
65.2%
6,185,853

-

o

4.0%
21.2%
20.5%
54.3%
4,652,597

3.3%
23.3%
21.6%
51.8%
6,436,654

3.0%
23.2%
21.8%
51.9%
6,815,315

2.9%
24.4%
22.8%
49.9%
7,212,553

2.0%
25.4%
24.5%
48.2%
6,475,135

o

0.8%
38.2%
36.1%
24.8%
5,307,174

Education Credit
Under $10,000
$10,000 under $25,000
$25,000 under $40,000
$40,000 and over
Total Returns

-

o

o

Retirement Savings Contribution Credit
Under $10,000
$10,000 under $25,000
$25,000 under $40,000
$40,000 and over
Total Returns
o
o
Source: lRS, Statistics of Income, Complete Year Data, Table 2 and Table 4.
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TA BLE2
SHARES OF CREDIT OOLLARS BY INCOME
YEAR

AGIRANGE

~
......

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Eamed Income Tax Credit
Under $10,000
$10,000 under $25,000
$25,000 under $40,000
$40,000 and over
Total Credit ($ thou sands)

40.9%
58.9%
0.2%
0.0%
25,955,574

38.6%
60.6%
0.8%
0.0%
28,825,257

35.4%
63.5%
1.1%
0.0%
30,388,582

33.1%
65.0%
1.9%
0.0%
31,591,791

33.0%
64.7%
2.3%
0.0%
31,901,107

31.1%
65.9%
3.0%
0.0%
32,296,342

29.0%
66.9%
4.1%
0.0%
33,375,973

26.3%
67.4%
6.3%
0.0%
38,198,572

Child Care Credit
Under $10,000
$10,000 under $25,000
$25,000 under $40,000
$40,000 and over
Total Credit ($ thousands)

0 .0%
20.7%
23.8%
55.5%
2,517,963

0.1%
19.5%
23.4%
57.0%
2,531,383

0.0%
18.7%
19.6%
61.7%
2,464,005

0.0%
16.2%
20.3%
63.5%
2,660,571

0.0%
13.4%
19.8%
66.8%
2,675,147

0.0%
12.9%
19.4%
67.6%
2,793,861

0.0%
12.7%
19.3%
68.1%
2,721,062

0.0%
11.9%
20.2%
68.0%
2,706,539

Edu cation Credit
Under $10,000
$10,000 under $25,000
$25,000 under $40,000
$40,000 and over
Total Credit ($ thousand s)
Retirement Savings Contribution Credit
Under $10,000
$10,000 und er $25,000
$25,000 under $40,000
$40,000 and over
Total Credit ($ thou sands)
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Source: IRS, Statistics of lncome, Complete Year Data, Table 2 and Table 4.

o

1.2%
18.1%
20.6%
60.1%
3,376,647

0.9%
19.9%
21.8%
57.3%
4,772,444

-

o

o

o

0.9%
20.7%
23.2%
55.2%
4,851,178

-

o

0.8%
22.0%
24.4%
52.8%
5,156,253

0.3%
18.9%
25.2%
55.7%
4,882,852

o

0.4%
38.2%
40.3%
21.1%
1,058,218
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Holtzblatt and McCubbin, (2004) caution
that this number might be closer to 81
percent if the GAO relaxed its assumption
that all taxpayers who failed to appear at
an audit were ineligible. Among households with one or two children, the GAO
(2001) estimates very high participation
rates of 96 and 93 percent, respectively.
Rates for those with three or more children
is estimated at 62.5 percent but, as Holtzblatt and McCubbin (2004) note, these data
for taxpayers with three or more children
may be less reliable because only two
children were required for a taxpayer to
qualify for the largest credit. Participation
among childless taxpayers was much
lower, at 44.7 percent.
At least three other papers focus on
EITC participation among the welfare
population, a group that is likely to have
low earnings. Hill, Hotz, Mullin and
Scholz (1999) estimated the federal EITC
participation rate among households in
four California counties that participated
in a federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) waiver demonstration program. Using 1993 and 1994
federal tax return data, matched to state
administrative data, Hill et al. (1999) estimate a participation rate between 42 and
84 among the EITC--eligible households
(only 21 to 53 percent of the sample is
eligible). The wide range of participation
estimates reflects alternative data samples
and difficulties implementing definitions
of income and qualifying children in administrative data.
Fajnzylber (2004) also studies the
California welfare recipient population
using state adrninistrative data matched
to state tax data. Among families eligible
for the EITC and receiving welfare benefits
between 1993 and 1999, he estima tes a participation rate of 64 percent. This relatively
low number is driven by the fact that only
70 percent of the families with income in

households receive the EITC. Beca use the
IRS automatically calculated the EITC for
eligible tax filers until the 1991 tax year,
all of the non-participation in 1990 is a
result of not filing taxes. In la ter tax years,
non-participation can also include eligible
individuals who filed a return but did not
claim the credit.
Blumenthal, Erard and Ho (2005) use
1988 data from IRS Taxpayer Compliance
studies and the 1989 Current Population
Survey (CPS) to estimate a participation
rate for the EITC. They report an overall
participation rate of between 69.4 and
74.3 percent. For taxpayers with a legal
obligation to file a tax return because their
gross income is above the tax threshold,
the authors estimate a participation rate
of 89 percent, while the estimated rate was
30.6 to 39.0 percent for those who are not
legally obligated to file (Blumenthal et al.,
2005). In simulations of the 1999 tax year,
they estimate a participation rate of 94.2
percent conditional on having income
greater than the tax threshold. The authors
note that the low participation among
those who are at the lowest income levels
may suggest that the EITC is less successful than traditional welfare programs in
assisting those in need.
Using 1996 tax year data from the CPS
matched to tax returns, the IRS (2002c)
estimates an EITC filer rate, or the percentage of EITC--eligible beneficiaries to file a
return, of at least 64.2 percent. Holtzblatt
and McCubbin (2004) note that the rate
from these data could be as high as 75 or
80 percent. 5 Using the SIPP self-reported
data about tax filing, the IRS also estimates
an EITC filing rate of at least 73.5.
The General Accounting Office (GAO)
(2001b), which estimated the EITCeligible population from the CPS combined with data from the IRS on the
number of eligible EITC claims, estimated
a 1999 participation rate of 75 percent.
5

The range is based on assurnptions concerning invalid Social Security nurnbers in the CPS and those who
refused to provide a Social Security Nurnber to the CPS interviewer.
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the EITC range in his sample filed a tax
retum. Of those filing, 92 percent claimed
the EITC.
Finally, we identified one participation
study for a state EITC. Hirasuna and
Stinson (2004) find an overall participation rate of 61.0 to 68.8 in the Minnesota's
Working Family Credit among eligible
welfare households between 1995 through
1999. They use state welfare data merged
with state income tax and wage data.
To this point we have shown participation-rate estimates among eligible taxpayers between 42 and 96 percent. The
rates on the high end are in 1990 when
the IRS calculated the EITC for incomeeligible tax filing units, the income eligibility phased out at lower incomes, and
families without children were ineligible.
However, even in later years estimates
suggest a participation rate below 100
percent because eligible tax units do
not file taxes. Among subpopulations,
participation is high among families
with one or two children and low among
welfare recipients, relative to the overall
population. The range of estimates also
highlights the sensitivity to using different
data sources.
The size of the EITC combined with
fears of high non-compliance has attracted a large literature on the utilization of the credit by ineligible taxpayers
(see Holtzblatt (1991), McCubbin (2000b ),
Liebman (2000), GAO (2001), Scholz
(1994)). When dividing the administrative data on the number of 1990 EITC
recipients by the number of households
eligible for the EITC based on survey
6

data, Scholz (1994) finds participation
rates between 122 and 131 percent, suggesting that a large number of technically
ineligible taxpayers file for and receive the
credit. While studies estimate that EITC
noncompliance declined in recent times,
perhaps due to both simplification of the
rules goveming EITC eligibility and increased enforcement, a 1999 IRS (2002b)
estimate of EITC noncompliance puts
the rate at 27 to 32 percent of all EITC
claims.

Influences
When considering the cost-benefit decision to claim the EITC, there is consistent
evidence that higher benefits, in the form
of a higher EITC, all else equal, are positively correlated with claiming the EITC
(Scholz, 1994; GAO, 2001b; IRS, 2002c;
Blumenthal et al., 2005).
On the cost side, characteristics associated with more time and money resources
such as two-parent households (Hill
et al., 1999; Scholz, 1994), fewer young
children (Fajnzylber, 2005), number of
children (IRS, 2002c), higher earnings
(Scholz, 1994; IRS, 2002c), and better
economic conditions at the county level
(Fajnzylber, 2005) are positively correlated
with claiming the EITC.
Anecdotally, the cost of gaining information about the credit is one barrier to
utilization. 6 For example, Maag (2005) reports that in 2001 only 58 percent of lowincome parents in the National Survey
of America's Families reported knowing
about the EITC. Surveys suggest that lack
of knowledge of the credit is systemati-

'"lt allowed us the American Dream,' Julio Escobar said.... After reading about EITC in a magazine, the
Honduran immigrant asked his tax preparer to review his returns. The result: $8,500 for three years' worth
of credits from the IRS" (Huntley, 2005).
"Nilsabel Rivera walked into a United Migran! Opportunity Services office on the south side one morning
to ffie her income laxes. A few minutes la ter, the single mother of two leamed that she would receive a refund
large enough for a down payment on a house .... Por Rivera, who was ffiing for two years, it was the first time
she had even heard about the eamed income tax credit program. "1 was clueless. 1 just knew 1 needed to do
my laxes," Rivera said. (Thomas-Lynn, 2003).
"Alfredo Martinez didn't know about the Earned Income Tax Credit until he realized it meant $106 more
in his pocket when he got his income-tax refund last year." (Markley, 2005).
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cally correlated with low education, low
income, and Hispanic ethnicity (Maag,
2005; Richardson, 2002; Ross Phillips,
2001). In an attempt to directly increase
information, many states, large cities and
non-profits are now running outreach
campaigns to educate their citizens about
the EITC. For example, the Houston Asset Building Coalition lists "[I]ncrease
awareness of the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) among low-income working families in Houston" as one of its
goals. 7 Anecdotal evidence suggests that
outreach campaigns increase utilization
(Berube, 2005; Office of the Mayor, 2005;
Children' Services Council, 2004).
Statistically, taxpayers who are likely to
have closer ties to the income tax system,
which represents a lower cost of filing
or gaining information about credits,
are more likely to claim the EITC. These
include those who live in states with an
income tax (Scholz, 1994), those who are
not on public assistance (Scholz, 1994;
IRS, 2002c) or those who have been on
public assistance for shorter rather than
longer time periods (Hill et al., 1999).
One rnight expect those who are not native English speakers to have a higher
cost of understanding and navigating
the income tax system and, in fact, Scholz
(1994) and Hirasuna and Stinson (2005)
find Hispanics less likely to file for the
EITC, even if eligible. The IRS (2002c) also
finds a high nonfiler rate in California and
among Hispanics. In contrast, Fajnzylber
(2005) finds that among California welfare
recipients, Hispanic families, as well as
black farnilies, are more likely to both file
a return and participate in the EITC. Likewise, higher education may be correlated
with a lower cost of filing and gaining
information, which is consistent with the
IRS (2002c) and Hirasuna and Stinson
7

8

9

(2004, 2005) who find higher education
positively correlated with claiming the
EITC. However, conditional on eligibility, Scholz (1994) finds that more highly
educated eligible taxpayers are less likely
to report filing the EITC.
Sorne argue that the complexity of the
credit creates costs that lower participation in the credit (White, 2005). A recent
literature focuses on the ability of tax
preparation sites to lower costs of filing
and, therefore, increase participation in
the EITC. Ignoring the potential endogenity of the location of free tax preparation sites, Hirasuna and Stinson (2005)
find that these tax preparation sites in
higher-poverty neighborhoods in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area are correlated
with greater participation in the state
EITC program.
Berube, Kim, Forman and Burns (2002)
note that almost 70 percent of EITC claimants rely on paid assistance to file a tax
return and the remaining literature on
tax-preparation focuses on paid preparers.8 Assuming that tax preparation services are not endogenous to communities
with large numbers of EITC-eligible tax
filers/ Fajnzylber (2005) uses California
administrative data to estimate that the
addition of one tax preparation services in
a zip code would increase the likelihood
of filing a retum and participating in the
federal EITC by roughly ten percentage
points. Using their 1988 TCMP data,
Blumenthal et al. (2005) find that tax preparation services do not effectively increase
EITC participation for eligible taxpayers.
Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2005) use 1988
to 1999 SOl data on states to conclude that
the tax-preparation industry exploited
e-filing technology, inducing low-income
individuals to file tax returns and claim
the EITC by providing these individuals

The following is the link toa Los Angeles program: http:/ /www.eitc-la.com/ .
Berube et al. (2002) point out the possible tradeoff between increased participation and lower benefits as a
function of fees charged by the tax-preparation industry.
He argues that preparation services increased in largely populated zip codes, and not necessarily in low-income
zip codes.
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a quick refund. They estimate that over
the 1988 to 1999 period, a one-percent
increase in the number of e-filing corresponds to a one-percent increase in the
number of EITC claims.
The literature on EITC noncompliance
addresses the cost-benefit decision of ineligible taxpayers utilizing the credit and
the transaction costs as a barrier to eligible
taxpayers using the credit. McCubbin
(2000) suggests that approximately 30 percent of noncompliance in the EITC is an
intentional decision related to improperly
claiming children, and there also seems
to be sorne intentional noncompliance
associated with filing status errors and
underreporting income. There is also
evidence that a significant amount of EITC
noncompliance is unintentional, resulting
from the complexity of the tax code, the
credit, and characteristics of low-income
filers, such as complicated family relationships and low levels of education and
language skills (Holtzblatt and McCubbin, 2004). Changes to program design
and program administration reflect an
attempt to raise the cost of participation among non-eligible individuals,
although they certainly have the potential
to change the costs of participation among
eligible taxpayers as well. Despite the simplification of the credit as well as increased
enforcement, the IRS does not know if
these efforts are effective (IRS, 2002b ).
One such effort is the pre-certification
program, a pilot program begun by the
IRS during the 2004 tax filing season requiring certain EITC claimants to prove
a dependent meets the residency requirements to be a qualifying child prior to
the IRS accepting an EITC claim (IRS,
2003). Based on preliminary data, the
pre-certification program reduced the
amount of EITC dollars claimed by ten
percent, especially reducing claims with
two or more qualifying children, and
prevented at least $4.5 million in erroneous EITC claims (IRS, 2005). However, the
preliminary report could not determine

if the reduction in claims was a result of
increased voluntary compliance among
previously ineligibles or a reduction in
participation among eligible claimants
(IRS, 2005).
Of all the tax credits considered in
this paper, the EITC has by far the most
research on all aspects of the credit. The
remaining credits are non-refundable and
have more categorical requirements, such
as specific required expenses. The nonrefundability of the remaining credits also
implies that households with particular!y
low income, below the tax threshold, have
no incentive to file taxes simply to claim
the credit. There is, therefore, much less
research for the other credits on why eligible recipients do not file the credit and
much more focus on why taxpayers are
ineligible for the credits.
Chíld and Dependent Care Credit

Description
The Child and Dependent Care Credit,
a non-refundable credit aimed at assisting individuals with dependents to work
or look for work, was estimated to cost
nearly $3 billion in fiscal year 2004 (OMB,
2005). The credit is available to taxpayers
with taxable earnings for expenses paid to
a non-dependent individual over the age
of 19 to care for either a dependent child
under the age of 13 ora dependent of any
age who is not physically or mentally capable to care for him or herself while the
taxpayer works or looks for work. If the
taxpayer is filing a joint retum, both the
taxpayer and spouse must have eamed
income unless one spouse is a full-time
student, and eligible expenses must be
lower than the secondary earner's income.
Since the 2003 tax year, taxpayers can claim
up to $3,000 of expenses per qualifying dependent,foruptoamaximumof$6,000.In
years prior to 2003, the maximum eligible
expense was $2,400 per qualifying dependent, for a total maximum of $4,800.
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ture is obsolete beca use the tax threshold
is far above $15,000. The 35-percent credit
rate is only marginally relevant for the
head-of-households with one child.U
For the federal child and dependent
care credit, taxpayers must report the
qualifying expenses and dependents
on a two-page Form 2441, which is accompanied by four pages of instructions
(IRS, 2004e).
Twenty-six states and the District of
Columbia have a child and dependent
care tax credit. 12 These credits are generally
modeled after the federal credit, with the
credit often calculated as a share of the federal credit. However, there are sorne key
differences that make sorne state programs
better targeted toward lower-income
households: sorne states have income
limits for credit eligibility and 13 states
have refundable credits (National Center
for Children in Poverty, 2005).

The credit is a percentage, based on
the taxpayer's AGI, of expenses incurred
while working or looking for work. Taxpayers with AGI at or below $15,000 can
claim 35 percent of expenses. The credit
rate is reduced by one percent for each
additional $2,000 of adjusted gross income
until $43,000, where the credit rate reaches
a constant and minimum rate of 20 percent. The credit does not fully capture all
expenses made for child care because payments made to providers "off the books"
are not eligible for the credit and eligible
expenses must be reduced by any pre-tax
dependent care benefits (Dependent Care
Assistance Plans). 10
Unlike the EITC, the Child Care credit
is not specifically targeted to low-income
individuals, although the progressive
rate structure has the potential to benefit
low-income individuals more. Returning
to Figures 1 and 2, we show the value of
the dependent and child care credit for a
joint filer with two children and a headof-household filer with one child, assuming the maximum child care expenses are
paid for each child. It is striking to note
how less well-targeted this credit is relative to the EITC for low-income taxpayers
due to the nonrefundability. For incomes
just above the tax threshold, the value of
the credit is only the difference between
the tax liability at the ten percent marginal
tax rate and the tax threshold, implying a
very low credit value. Although the credit
rate is 35 percent for taxpayers with AGI
below $15,000, the figure for joint filers
with two children highlights that this fea-

10

11
12

Utilization

Estimates
Tables 1 and 2 shows the utilization
over time from SOl data. Approximately
six rnillion returns are filed claiming the
child care credit and the dollar value of
the credit is around $2.5 billion for all
the years in the tables. Because the credit
is not refundable, almost no taxpayers
claiming the credit have income below
$10,000. With no upper-end income limit,
by the 2000s, more than two-thirds of all
returns filed and dollars received are by
taxpayers with more then $40,000.

These pre-tax benefits provided by an employer are essentially valued at the pre-tax dollar contribution
amount multiplied by the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. This is less relevant for low-income individuals
because even if employers offer such plans (Eiler and Hrung (2003)) report that only 30 percent of full-time
workers in medium and large establishments were eligible for this benefit in 1997), the low-marginal tax rates
faced by these taxpayers typically imply a low value of the Dependen! Care Assistance Plans relative to the
taxcredit.
Obviously, as a share of income, the credit value may be higher for eligible households with lower income.
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon and Vermont have refundable credits. Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode lsland, South Carolina and
Vrrginia have non-refundable credits.
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suggests survey respondents are inaccurate in reporting their credit receipt. Conditioning on families who report working
parents and positive child care expenses,
just over 50 percent of those in the bottom
third and top third of the income distribution report claiming the credit.

The existing literature on utilization
of the Child and Dependent Care Credit
among low-income individuals comes
from studies of the progressivity of the
credit. This research relies almost entirely
on income tax data and finds that taxpayers at the bottom of the income distribution rarely use the credit due to a lack of
refundability. For example, Altshuler and
Schwartz (1996) note that in a 1983 cross
section and a ten-year panel of tax return
data, the lack of tax liability prevented
virtually all taxpayers with dependents in
the first decile and half of those in the second decile from benefiting from the credit
even if they would have had expenses
eligible for the child care credit. Using
1989 income tax data, Gentry and Hagy
(1996) find that fewer than three percent
of families with dependents and income
below $10,000 take the credit. Overall,
they find that 15.7 percent of families
with dependents claim the credit in 1989.
Finally, with 1998 tax return data that is
not restricted to families with dependents,
Eiler and Hrung (2003) find that no taxpayers in the bottom two deciles receive
a benefit and the benefit to those in the
third decile is minimal.
A major limitation to using income tax
data to estimate utilization is the inability to establish eligibility for the credit.
Income tax data does not include the age
of the children, the income distribution
within a couple, or data on child care
expenses if the tax unit did not claim the
credit. To address sorne of these issues,
Gentry and Hagy (1996) use data from
the 1989 National Child Care Survey to
estimate usage rates. They calculate that
overall 29.9 percent of families with an
age-eligible child report participating in
the credit program, with participation
roughly increasing with income. Their
work highlights the shortcomings of using
survey data as well because they find that
21 percent families with income below
$5,000 report claiming the credit, which,
given the nonrefundability of the credit,

Influences
Gentry and Hagy's (1996) estimates
using survey data suggest that there are
eligible individuals who do not claim the
credit. This is not the focus of their paper,
so they do not investigate this question
and, to our knowledge, there is little or
no research that considers why eligible
individuals do not file for the credit. One
explanation addressed by Eiler and Hrung
(2003) is that sorne families receive a larger
tax benefit by choosing the Dependent
Care Assistance Plans.
Most of what we know about what
influences the utilization of the Child and
Dependent Care Credit reflects the labor
force participation and child care choices
of families that make them eligible for the
credit, rather than a decision of eligible
families to file for the credit. Usage among
low-income households is low because
these taxpayers are not categorically eligible for the credit. Specifically, they do
not have dependent children under the
age of 13 or other qualifying dependents,
they do not have qualifying child care
expenses or they do not have two-earner
families. Altshuler and Schwartz (1996),
for example, find that fewer than 30 percent of 1983 taxpayers in the bottom two
AGI deciles claim dependents. Gentry
and Hagy (1996) find similar results using
1989 tax data.
Using the NCCS survey data that ineludes data on children's ages, child care
expenses and earnings of both spouses
in a couple, Gentry and Hagy (1996) find
results consistent with tax data: farnilies
with low incomes do not use the tax credit
beca use they have zero tax liability. They
also find that the low-income families
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are less likely to be eligible for the credit
beca use they do not work or do not have
qualifying child care expenses. A small
share of low-income families are ineligible beca use their child care expenses are
above the secondary earner's income.
Single parents are more likely to claim the
credit, conditional on income, probably
reflecting the work requirement (that is,
both spouses in a married couple must
work). Conditional on having a child under the age of 13, families are more likely
to utilize the credit if they have younger
children, the mother is more educated, the
family has fewer children, and the family
uses child care centers or family day care
centers for their child care. Again, these
characteristics primarily reflect labor market and child care decisions that would
make the family eligible for the credit.

$2,000 (Fitzpatrick and Maag, 2003). One
important difference between the credits
is that each eligible student in the tax unit
may claim the HOPE credit, while the
Lifetime Learning Credit is computed for
the entire tax unit. The OMB (2005) estimates the Hope Credit cost at $3.3 billion
in 2004 and the Lifetime Learning Credit
cost at $2.2 billion.
To claim either credit, a taxpayer fills
out Forro 8863, where they are responsible for reporting the eligible student
and expenses (IRS, 2004f). Two pages
of instructions describe the eligibility
requirements.
There are at least three reasons why
the credits may not be well targeted at
low-income taxpayers. First, like the
Child and Dependent Care Credit, the
education credits are non-refundable.
The by-now-familiar Figures 1 through
3 show the effect of non-refundability,
which has the same effect on the credit
value as the Child and Dependent Care
credit for our hypothetical families. What
is not obvious in these figures is that taking one credit may preclude taking others
for households that are eligible to claim
multiple credits, if the credits reduce
tax liability to zero. Second, while both
education credits ha ve inflation-adjusted
income limitations, the maximum income
is well above the median income. In 2004
both credits are phased out by one percent
for each additional $100 in AGI between
$85,000 and $105,000 for joint filers and
between $42,000 and $52,000 for singles
and head-of-households (IRS, 2004f)Y
Third, students cannot count required
tuition and fees paid with non-taxable
funds, such as scholarships and grants,
but they can count required tuition and
fees paid with loaned funds. As a result,
students from low- and moderate-income
families who qualify for the federal Pell
Grant or similar state means-tested grant
programs may receive little or no benefit

Education Credits
Description

The 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act created
two non-refundable tax credits for required tuition and fees for post-secondary
education: the HOPE Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit. Each eligible student may only claim one education credit
in a tax year. The HOPE tax credit, which
is only available for the first two years
of post-secondary education, provides
a lOQ-percent credit on the first $1,000 of
required tuition and fees and a 5Q-percent
credit on the second $1,000, for a total
maximum credit of $1,500. The Lifetime
Learning Credit is, in contrast, available
for an unlimited number of years, including graduate work. Until the 2003 tax year,
the credit was equal to 20 percent of $5,000
of required tuition and fees, for a total
maximum credit of $1,000. Beginning in
the 2003 tax year, the credit was equal to
20 percent of $10,000 of required tuition
and fees, for a total maximum credit of
13

Figures 1 through 3 also illustrate how different phaseout ranges are for joint filers relative to others.
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for the education credits, while wealthier
students who receive student aid through
various government subsidized loan programs can receive larger credits.
Utilization

Estima tes
Tables 1 and 2 show the utilization of
the education credits over time. In the 1998
tax year, the first year that the credits were
available, the IRS reports that 4.6 million
returns claimed an education credit. Since
that time, the number of returns claiming an education credit has grown to 7.4
million in the 2003 tax year, according to
preliminary data from the IRS (Balkovic,
2005). Table 2 shows the credit is not
heavily utilized by low-income taxpayers. Around half of all returns filing for
an education credit have AGI in excess of
$40,000 and more than half of the credit
dollars accrue to this group.
Using the IRS Master File in the 2000 tax
year, Long (2004) finds evidence consistent
with Tables 1 and 2: only one percent of taxpayers with AGI less than $1 O,000 claimed
a credit, while 12.43 percent of those
taxpayers with AGI between $75,000 and
$100,000 claimed a credit. The evidence
from survey data provides a different
denominator as a comparison group. Using data from the National Postsecondary
Student Aid Survey (NPSAS) from 1999
to 2000, the GAO (2002b) estimated that
40 percent of all college undergraduates
received an education tax credit, but only
four percent of all dependent undergraduates and nine percent of all independent
undergraduates with family incomes less
than $20,000 received the credit. 14
Conditional on being eligible for the
credits, there is a wide range of partid14

15

pation rate estimates. The GAO (2002),
using the 1999 to 2000 NPSAS, assumed
that approximately 90 percent of undergraduates eligible for a credit claimed
one, and found this assumption produced
an estimate of the cost of the education
credits that was 94 percent of the actual
IRS estimate. However, they acknowledged that there is no reliable data on the
rate that those eligible for the HOPE and
Lifetime Learning Credits claim the credit
because no dataset includes tax return
information, post-secondary enrollment
and degree information, and receipt of
federal student aid programs, all of which
are required to accurately assess eligibility (GAO, 2002b)Y A survey matched
with administrative financia! aid data
of a 3,985 randomly selected University
of California (UC) students conducted
in 2000 by Hoblitzell and Smith (2001)
also estima tes a relatively high education
credit participation rate: 78 percent for the
1999 tax year. Specifically, 37 percent of
UC students were eligible and 29 percent
report using a credit. Forty-five percent
of those claiming the credit carne from
families with less than $60,000 in annual
income and 22 percent carne from families
with less than $20,000.
Long (2004) notes that UC students tend
to be wealthier than the national average,
making it difficult to generalize from the
Hoblitzell and Smith (2001) study. Using
the 1999-2000 NPSAS, Long (2004) estimates that 43 percent of all undergraduates are eligible for an educational credit,
but less than a third of eligible students
acknowledged during the telephone interview portian of the NPSAS that they
or their parents claimed the credit. Using
two definitions of eligible students, she

Moreover, undergraduates with family incomes of less than $20,000 also received a smaller average credit
than those with higher family incomes.
The NPSAS has good irúormation on enrollment, degree, and eligible expenses, but relies on self-reported or
imputed data on income for students who do not apply for financia! aid. Also, because the Lifetime Learning
Credit is based on returns the Hope is based on students, it is difficult to accurately assess eligibility without
making it household tax irúormation, including income. Finally, income and tuition irúormation are based on
the academic year, while tax eligibility relies on the tax year.

759

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL

consistently finds that slightly fewer than
30 percent of all eligible students claimed
a credit, with dependent undergraduates
having the lowest participation rate of all
students, at approximately 20 percent.
Long (2004) also notes that in the IRS Masterfile, almost 3,000 taxpayers with income
over the income limit claimed the credit,
suggesting utilization among ineligible
taxpayers or simply errors in the data.
Studies of the education credits show
a very wide range of participation rates
among eligible taxpayers, including fewer
than 30 percent up to 78 percent. As in the
EITC estimates, the range of estimates
highlights the sensitivity to using different data sources. The highest rates are
those using administrative data on the
number of filers, while the rates at the low
end are based on self-reported tax credit
information.

lnformation costs may be a large factor
in non-filing. Long (2004) finds that only
33 percent of eligible parents in the 1999
National Household Education Survey
reported knowledge of either credit.
Characteristics positively correlated with
awareness of the credit include income,
education of the parent, children closer
to college age, non-minority status and
graduate-student status. Hoblitzell and
Smith (2001) find that 59 percent of
non-filers did not claim the credit beca use
they believed they were ineligible and 27
percent of all non-filers said they were
unaware of the credit. As sorne confirmation to the misinformation about the credit,
the survey data show that most students
believe they are ineligible because their
income was too high, yet the administrative data indicates that most students were
ineligible because of the non-taxable aid
restriction. Presumably due to concerns
about information, the University of
California system provided additional
information to assist their students in
claiming the federal credits, including detailed information about their educational
finances as well as a brochure about the
credits (Holitzell and Smith, 2001). There
is no evidence that we know of about
whether these policies are successful.
Long (2004) also finds that demographics associated with lower costs of filing or
gaining information about the credit are
positively correlated with eligible taxpayers filing the credit. These include being
married, being a dependent or having a
parent with sorne college experience. Long
(2004) also finds that eligible female and
white students were more likely to claim
the credit than male students and students
from other racial groups.

Influences
Eligibility clearly influences utilization.
Like the literature on utilization of the
Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit
there is sorne focus on taxpayers not filing because they are not eligible. Both the
GAO (2002) and Long (2004) find students
were often ineligible for the credits dueto
the income limitations of the credit or lack
of tax liability.
In addition, there is evidence that the
larger the benefit is of filing the credit, the
more likely a taxpayer is to file. Specifically, in the California survey data, Hoblitzell
and Smith (2001) find that eight percent
of main-campus students who did not
claim a credit reported that the credit
amount was too small to be worthwhile.
Long (2004) notes that utilization is positively correlated with attending four-year
institutions, holding independent status,
living in states with higher tuition burdens, and relying on federal financia!
aid programs to finance education, all of
which are correlates to higher tuition costs
as a share of income and, therefore, higher
benefits of the credit.

Saver's Credit
Description

The Retirement Saver's Contribution
Credit, "Saver's Credit," began in 2001
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The OMB (2005) estima tes that the Saver's
Credit cost $970 million in 2004.
By now, the lines in Figures 1, 2 and 3
are not surprising. The nonrefundability
of the credit does not allow taxpayers with
income below the tax threshold to utilize
the credit. Nonrefundability, combined
with the marginal tax rate parameters and
the credit phaseout lead to a quirk in the
credit's design. Note that for the headof-household and single taxpayers in our
figures, the maximum credit of $1,000 (50
percent of a $2,000 contribution) is never
attainable because their tax liability over
the range where the 50--percent credit is in
place is always below $1,000.17 Likewise,
joint filers can never attain the maximum
$2,000 credit.
To file for this credit, a taxpayer must
list qualifying savings contributions for
their family on the single-page Form 8880
(IRS, 2004d), which is accompanied by a
single page of instructions.

and is scheduled to expire in 2006. The
goal is to provide incentives for low- to
moderate-income households to save for
retirement and to provide an altemative
to the structure of most other retirement
savings incentives that tend to benefit
higher-income workers (Cale, lwry and
Orszag, 2004). The credit is a nonrefundable tax credit for contributions of up to
$2,000 (not indexed for inflation) made to
an Individual Retirement Account (IRA)
or an employer-defined contribution
plan for households with low to moderate incomes. Joint filers with AGI (not
indexed for inflation) of up to $50,000,
head-of-household filers with up to
$37,500 in AGI, and single filers with AGI
of up to $25,000 can receive a credit up to
50 percent of their contribution. For joint
filers, each spouse may claim the credit.
The percentage phases down quickly from
50 percent to ten percent between AGI of
$30,000 to $32,501 for joint filers, $22,500 to
$24,376 for head-of-household filers and
$15,000 to $25,000 for single filers. 16 In an
effort to prevent taxpayers from moving
money into an account only to claim the
credit, the IRS reduces the amount of the
credit if the taxpayer received distributions
from certain pension and IRAs. The contribution eligible for the credit is reduced by
distributions received in the tax year for
which the credit is claimed, the two preceding tax years, and in the period after the
end of the tax year, but before the due date
for filing the retum. This constraint may
be particularly relevant for low-income
taxfilers who are more likely to be liquidity
constrained and rely on savings income.
16

17

Utilization

Estima tes
Tables 1 and 2 show that in 2002, the first
year of the credit, there were 5.3 million
retums that claimed the saver's credit, at
a cost of approximately $1.1 billion. Once
taxpayers have reached the tax threshold,
the rapid phaseout rate of the credit ensures that lower-income families receive
more of the credit: 75 percent of the retums
and 80 percent of the credit dollars accrue
to taxpayers with AGI below $40,000.
The literature on utilization of the
Saver's Credit focuses a great deal on the
design features that make low-income

For joint filers with AGI $0 to $30,000, the rate is 50 percent; 30,001 to $32,500, 20 percent; and $32,501 to
$50,000, ten percent.
For example, in 2004 a head-of-household filer with one child has a standard deduction of $7,150 and two
personal exemptions of $3,100 for a tax threshold of $13,350. A head-of-household taxpayer with $22,000 of
income, still in the maximum 50-percent credit range, has taxable income of $8,650 ($22,000-$13,350). With
a marginal tax rate of ten percent, the tax liability is $865, well below the maximum tax credit of $1,000. The
maximum tax credit is never available to head-of-households. The same is true for single filers. In 2004 the
tax threshold is $7,950 ($4,850 standard deduction plus the $3,100 personal exemption). With income in the
maximum credit range and, therefore, a marginal tax rate of 10 percent, their tax liability is always below the
credit amount.
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individuals ineligible for the credit. Burman, Gale, Hall and Orszag (2004) use
an Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center
microsimulation model to conclude
that in 2004 approximately five percent
of all filing units would use the credit
with the benefits spread roughly evenly
between the second, middle, and fourth
cash income quintiles. 18 However, only
0.2 percent of the lowest cash income
quintile would receive a benefit. In simulations with refundability added to the
creditstructure,thelowestquintilewould
receive 15 percent of the benefits, the second quintile, 38 percent, and the middle
quintile, 34 percent. Orszag and Hall
(2003), using the same Tax Policy Center
model, estimate that only 20 percent of
those income eligible, in the 2003 tax
year, would receive any benefit from the
tax credit if they contributed to an IRA
or 401(k), and only 0.1 percent of those
income eligible would receive the maximum $1,000 credit if they contributed the
$2,000 maximum.
Koenig and Harvey (2005) in this volume use actual tax return data to estimate
utilization in the first year of the Saver's
Credit. They use 2002 Statistics of Income
data that is linked to W-2, and other
tax forms that provide information on
eligible savings contribution, to estimate
the utilization of the Saver's Credit. They
identify a sample of taxpayers that meet
the following categorical requirements for
the credit: at least age 18 years old, not a
student,I9 not a dependent. In estimating
utilization, the authors assume that those

18
19

20

who report receiving the credit are eligible
for the credit, even if their methodology
does not show the individual as eligible,
under the assumption that there are
data errors that prevent them from correctly identifying all eligible individuals.
Conditioning on positive tax liability in
this group reduces the number of filers
potentially eligible for the Saver's Credit
by 40 percent. Overall, they estimate
14.2 percent of these categorically and
income-eligible filers take the credit,
with the utilization rate highest among
heads-of-households. Further restricting
the sample of filers who made contributions to a retirement account, the authors
estima te that 66 percent of these tax filers
took the credit.
Brady and Hrung (2005) find that the
so called "anti-churning rule," which reduces contributions eligible for the Saver's
Credit by the amount of IRA and 401(k)
distributions during the contribution year
and the prior two years, reduces by up to
18 percent the number of taxpayers that
otherwise fully qualify for the credit and
have eligible contributions. Overall, they
find that approximately 55 percent of all
eligible taxpayers take the credit. 20

Influences
"Ineligibility because the credit is not
refundable" is one explanation for why
low-income individuals do not use the
Saver's Credit. Another explanation for
potentially low utilization is that lowincome taxpayers do not save in taxdeferred retirement savings plans. Koenig

The tax model uses 1999 SOl data, 2000 CPS along with the Survey of Consumer Finances and SIPP.
They cannot distinguish full- from part-time students, and only full-time students are ineligible. However,
even assuming all students were eligible for the saver's credit does not change their estimates greatly.
However, they do not categorize al! those that take the credit as eligible. Specifically, they categorize about
600,000 taxpayers who took the credit (about 11.5 percent of taxpayers with a credit) as ineligible. If, in fact,
these taxpayers are incorrectly coded as ineligible, and their number is added to both the numerator and
denominator, the take-up rate would increase to 58 percent. The authors are only able to identify taxpayers
as students if they took the HOPE or Lifetime Learning Credits. As such, they may be overestimating the
eligible population and underestimating the take-up rate. The difference in estimated take-up rates between
Brady and Hrung (2005) and Keonig and Harvey (2005) may be due in part to their methods of identifying
full-time students.

762

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Federallncome Tax Credits for Low-lncome Familias

and Harvey (2005) show that fewer than
13 percent of taxpayers in the first three
AGI deciles save in tax deferred savings
plans. Brady and Hrung (2005) show that
of the taxpayers who would have qualified for a Saver's Credit in 2001 (the year
before the credit was in effect) based on
the criterion of age, AGI, and the presence
of eamings (but without regard to having
positive tax liability), fewer than 25 percent contributed toan IRA ora 401(k)-type
plan. 21 The authors also find that, at least
in its first year, the credit does not appear
to have greatly increased the number of
low-income individuals contributing to
retirement accounts: nearly 80 percent of
those who took the credit in 2002 had contributed to a retirement account in 2001.
The benefit of the credit appears to
influence the utilization of the credit. Koenig and Harvey (2005) show that eligible
non-claimants are eligible for smaller
credit amounts than eligible claimants,
although the credit for those who should
have claimed the credit is quite significant.
A large randomized field experiment
among H&R Block clients in the low- and
middle-income St. Louis neighborhoods
during the 2005 tax filing season (Duflo,
Gale, Liebman, Orszag and Saez, 2005)
also sheds light on the how the design of
the credit may affect participation. The
authors, in conjunction with H&R Block,
offered matching contributions in addition to the Saver 's Credit to savings of zero
percent, 20 percent or 50 percent at the
time of tax preparation. They found that
the match rate had a large and positive effect on take-up of the IRA contribution.
Given that all the data used to date on
the utilization of the Saver 's Credit is from
the first year of the credit, lack of informa21

tion about the credit may be an important
influence for those not using the credit. As
support for this hypothesis, Brady and
Hrung (2005) show that tax payers using
paid preparers are much more likely to
claim the credit than those filing their own
taxes. Koenig and Harvey (2005) find that
eligible taxpayers who claimed the credit
were more likely to use a professional
tax preparer or a computer software program to complete their returns than those
eligible taxpayers who did not claim the
credit. Duflo et al. (2005) find that take-up
of the matching IRA contribution was
strongly related to the specific tax professional who worked with the client. They
also find that take-up of the IRA for those
eligible for the Saver's Credit was only
slightly higher than for those not eligible,
which the authors believe may be related
to the complexity of the rules governing
the Saver's Credit.
As in the case with other credits we
have considered, those individuals facing
lower costs of filing seem more likely to
utilize the credit. Duflo et al. (2005) find
that take-up was also higher for married
filers and increased with income.
EMPLOYER-CLAIMED INCOME TAX
CREDITS 22

The Federal tax system also has a
number of credits targeted at low-income
individuals through employers of lowincome individuals. Generally there are
two types: (1) the categorically targeted,
i.e., those that target hiring specific types
of employees, typically those who received govemment aid; and (2) the geographically targeted, i.e., those that target
the hiring of employees from a geographi-

Using 1996 Statistics of Income (SOl) data linked to information from W-2 forms, Joulfaian and Richardson
(2001) find that participation in eligible savings is relatively low for single-eamer households, households
with dependents, lower-wage eamers, those with smaller amounts of non-labor income or those who face
lower marginal tax rates. The Congressional Budget Office (2003}, using 1997 tax data, found that utilization
of tax-deferred retirement plans was substantially less likely for workers with lower levels of adjusted gross
income.

22

Appendix Table 2A summarizes the research on each employer-claimed income tax credit.
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cal region that has high poverty and unemployment rates. The employers can be
corporations or individual taxpayers with,
for example, sole proprietorships.

ing in a maximum credit of $2,400 (IRS,
2004g)Y
When filing taxes, the employer claims
the WOTC for all certified employees by
reporting the number of qualified employees and their hours on Form 5884,
a single-page form with two pages of
instructions (IRS, 2004h). The OMB (2005)
estimated the WOTC cost to be $205 million in the 2004 fiscal year.
The Small Business Job Protection Act
established the WOTC in order to improve
upon its predecessor, the Targeted Job
Tax Credit (TJTC), which existed from
1978 until the end of 1994. The TJTC had
a more generous credit rate of 40 or 50
percent and defined at-risk youth somewhat differently-as 19- to 23-year-olds
who were in farnilies earning less than 70
percent of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
lower living standard for each of the last
six months Goint Committee on Taxation,
1996). The goal in updating the TJTC to
the WOTC was to " ... [create a] program
whose design will focus on individuals
with poor workplace attachments, streamline administrative burdens, promote
longer-term employment, and thereby
reduce costs relative to the prior-law
program Goint Committee on Taxation,
1996, 97)."
The Tax Reform Act of 1997 created a
second large-scale employer tax credit
aimed at low-income individuals-the
Welfare to Work (WtW) Program-as a
way to encourage firms to hire long-term
welfare recipients. Firms are eligible to
receive a credit for 35 percent of wages
paid in the first year of employment and
50 percent in the second year (for the first
$10,000 in wages, resulting in a maximum
credit of $8,500 for both years) for a certified employee who works at least 400
hours. Certifiable employees must have
received TANF for at least 18 consecutive

Categorical/y Targeted EmployerC/aimed Tax Credits
Description
The largest of the credits that targets
specific types of employers is the Work
Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), which
began in 1996 and was recently extended
to include wages paid in 2005. The WOTC
requires employees to be certified with a
state employment security agency (SESA)
beforestartingworkbyeither (1) receiving
certification from the SESA on the da y the
employee begins work or (2) completing
a request for certification (IRS, 2002a)
on or before the employer makes the
job offer and subrnitting the form by the
21 •• day after the individual begins work

(IRS, 2004g). Eligible employees for the
WOTC include: vocational rehabilitation
referrals; economically disadvantaged
youth, which are defined as 18- to
24-year-olds who live in an Empowerment Zone, an IRS-specified Enterprise
Community, or hail from a farnily that currentiy or recently received food stamps;
economically disadvantaged Vietnam
veterans; Supplemental Security Income
recipients; econornically disadvantaged
former convicts; and workers who have
received AFDC or Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) for at least
nine of the previous 18 months. Certified
employees must work a mínimum of 120
hours and the credit rate is 25 percent of
wages for work up to 400 hours. If the
employee works more than 400 hours,
a 40 percent subsidy rate applies up to
a maximum of $6,000 in wages, result23

Prior to the Tax Reform Act (TRA) 1997, the credit required eligible employees to work a minimum of 400
hours and paid 35 percent ofwages up lo $6,000 for a maximum credit of$2,100 Qoint Committee on Taxation,
1996). Also the age requirement for at-risk youth was 25.

764

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Federallncome Tax Credits for Low-lncome Familias

months prior to being hired, have become
ineligible for assistance from the state or
federal government or belong to a family
that received TANF for any 18-month
period after August 1997 and within
two years of being hired (IRS, 2004g). 24
The certification process is identical to
the process for the WOTC. To claim the
credit an employer must file form 8861,
a single-page form with two pages of instructions requiring the employer to report
the total amount of qualified first-year
and second-year wages paid to qualified
employees (IRS, 2004i). The program was
recently extended to include wages paid
for employees starting work in 2004. OMB
(2005) estima tes a $60 million tax expenditure in 2004 for the WtW credit.
Utilization

Estima tes
Tables 3 and 4 show the utilization of
the WOTC and WtW over time. Of course,
there is no need to show the share claimed
on behalf of low-income individuals
because the credits explicitly require
low-income individuals to be the targets.
The Tables show a large increase in the
number of returns filed (particular!y those
filed by individuals) and credit amounts
(particularly those filed by corporations)
since the inception of the WOTC. By 2002,
the utilization of the WOTC is comparable
in return and dollars to the last year of
the TJTC. The WtW credit has also seen
dramatic growth in the utilization; five
years after its enactment, the credit dollars
have increased almost five fold.

with estimates of firm utilization. IRS
data show that in 1999, about one out
of 790 corporations and one out of 3,450
individuals with a business affiliation
reported the WOTC on their tax retums
(GAO, 2002a). These dramatically low
participation rates are even smaller than
those for the former TJTC. Using a Department of Labor 1979 and 1980 survey
of 5,859 firms, Bishop and Montgomery
(1986) find that while 13 percent of firms
that reported knowledge of the TJTC
claimed the credit, only 2.25 percent of all
firms surveyed claimed the TJTC. Bishop
and Kang (1991) also find dramatically
low participation rates for the TJTC, using
a Gallup survey, designed by the National
Center for Research in Vocational Education, of 3,412 firms. Bishop and Kang
(1991) estímate that participation was 4.3
percent in 1980, 3.5 percent in the first part
of 1981, and only 2.7 percent for the end
of 1981/beginning of 1982.
While these estimates are shockingly
low, the target of these programs is the
eligible employees, not the employer. For
this reason, although ultimately the firm
decides whether to file for the WOTC, the
goal of the program is arguably to provide
jobs for as many of the eligible population
as possible. For this reason, participation
rates among eligible employees may be a
more meaningful participation rate.
Hamersma (2003) estimates the participation rate of the targeted population in
the WOTC and WtW credits. She focuses
on participation rates among those meeting the welfare eligibility criteria because

Research on the utilization of the cat-

identifying other eligible groups, such

egorically targeted employer-claimed tax
credits has two dimensions. One is the
firm' s utilization decision and the second
is the number of individuals affected by
firms utilizing the credit.
Because the firm ultimately decides
whether to file for the credit, we begin

as ex-felons, is impossible in survey
data. The numerators are the number
of employees certified for the WOTC or
WtW by the Department of Labor. The
number of employees certified may exceed the number subsidized due to the
mínimum hours worked requirement,

24

The WtW credit cannot be claimed for wages that have aiready been used to claim the WOTC or Empowerment Zone credits.
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TABLE3
EMPLOYER TAX RETURNS: TAX YEARS 19%-2003
(All Figures Are Estimates Based on Samples)
TaxYear
1995
(1)

!tem
All individual retums

All corporate retums

'l

o-o--

1996
(2)

1998

1997
(3)

(4)

1999
(5)

2000
(6)

2001

2002

(7)

(8)

2003
(9)

118,218,327
4,474,167

120,351,208
4,631,370

122,421,991
4,710,083

124,770,662
4,848,888

127,075,145
4,935,904

129,373,500
5,045,274

130,255,237
5,135,591

130,076,443
5,266,607

130,423,626

N/ A
N/A

5,290
671
5,961

7,304
2,653
9,957

7,823
2,000
9,823

8,483
2,086
10,569

8,301
2,297
10,598

9,988
1,789
11,777

17,690
1,752
19,442

17,150

NI A
NIA
NIA

N/A
N/A

"35

2,349

538
2,887

1,549
1,082
2,631

2,936
986
3,922

3,058
678
3,736

3,615
785
4,400

3,535

·s
o

18,613
2,910
21,523

N/ A
N/A
N/A

N/ A

N/ A
N! A

N/ A
N/ A

N/ A
N/ A

NIA

N/ A
N/ A

N! A
N/ A

NIA

N/A
N/ A
N/ A

NIA

NIA
NIA

NI A

NIA

239
193
432

460

686
630
1,316

3,100
402
3,502

4,752
420
5,172

5,073
479
5,552

6,745
559
7,304

17,250
1,657
18,907

22,553

4,757
587
5,344

5,100
675
5,775

7,627
795
8,422

19,564
2,544
22,108

25,539

Work opportunity tax credit
Individual
Corporate
Total
Welfare to work tax credit
Individual
Corporate
Total
jobs credit'
Individual
Corporate
Total
Empowerment zone credit 1
Individual
Corporate
Total

NIA

NIA

464
924

NIA

u
u
u
u

u
u

Tentative empowerment zone credit 1

Individual
461
3,105
250
849
Corporate
539
697
330
861
Total
1,158
1,710
3,644
580
Notes:
N / A- No! applicable; U- Unavailab1e al time of publicatíon.
• Estimate should be used with caution dueto small number of sample retums it is based on.
1
For Tax Years 2002 and 2003, the empowerment zone credit data includes the renewal community employment credit.
2
Represents prior year returns included in the 1995 individual income retums statistics.
Source: Statistics of Income Division, personal correspondence.
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TABLE4
EMPLOYER TAX CREDIT AMOUNTS: TAX YEARS 1995--2003
(All Figures Are Estima tes Based on Samples; Money Amounts Are in Thousands of Dollars)

5"
o
3
(1)

(')

Tax Year
ltem

1995
(1)

1996
(2)

1997
(3)

~

~

1999
(5)

Work opportunity tax credit
8,473
15,436
29,044
32,197
NIA
Individual
118,757
232,675
221,678
6,896
Corporate
N/ A
253,875
15,369
134,193
261,719
Total
NIA
Welfare to work tax credit
*55
2,587
5,335
Individu al
N/ A
N/A
*51
77,357
18,185
NIA
NIA
Corporate
20,772
82,692
NI A
Tota l
N /A
)obs credit'
38,992
N/ A
N/ A
N/ A
N/ A
Individual
174,361
N/ A
N/A
N! A
N /A
Corporate
NI A
N! A
N /A
213,353
Total
N/ A
Empowerment zone credit 1
10,810
19,091
22,088
26,728
8,497
Individual
9,382
13,223
19,118
21,645
7,409
Corporate
48,373
41,206
15,906
20,192
32,314
Total
1
Tentative empowerment zone credit
11,863
23,047
27,488
31,469
9,489
Individual
44,181
10,684
21,532
36,694
36,647
Corporate
20,173
33,395
59,741
64,135
75,650
Total
Notes:
N 1A - Not applicable; U · Un available at time of publica !ion.
• Fstimate should be used with caution dueto small number of sample retums it is based on.
'For Tax Years 2002 and 2003, the empowerment zone credit data includes the renewal community employment credit.
'Represents prior year retums included in the 1995 individual income retums s tatistics.
Source: Statistics of lncome Division, personal co rrespondence.
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1998
(4)

2000
(6)

2001
(7)

2002

30,406
235,689
266,095

33,151
207,201
240,352

55,029
216,235
271,264

54,865

10,595
91,973
102,568

16,269
97,891
114,160

14,593
102,419
117,012

13,117

(8)

2003
(9)
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NI A

NIA

N/ A
N/ A
N! A

21,948
23,527
45,475

24,274
23,401
47,675

61,262
59,695
120,957

83,449

42,468
56,259
98,727

38,763
64,073
102,836

101,247
146,014
247,261

157,672

NI A

N/ A

N/ A
N/ A

N/ A

N/ A
N/ A
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yet the number of subsidized employees
is not collected by the government. Using the SIPP, she calculates the number
of eligiblé5 individuals in two ways. The
first uses the number of those potentially
eligible for the credit based on a certain
demographic characteristic. Due to data
limitations, this characteristic is youth
recipients of food stamps. The second estímate uses the number of the eligible and
newly hired, which eliminates those who
are out of the labor force. She estimates
a WOTC participation rate between 0.2
and 3.3 percent for the potentially eligible
and between 0.3 and 16.6 percent conditional on them being new hires. The total
eligible population for the WtW credit
cannot be disentangled from those who
could be claimed under the WOTC using
SIPP data. As a compromise, Hamersma
(2003) estimates a 1999 participation rate
for a sample eligible for either the WOTC
or the WtW: respondents who received at
least nine months of welfare in the past
18 months. Her estima tes are between 3.7
and 5.7 percent for all individuals meeting the welfare criteria and, conditioning
on respondents who were new hires, she
estimates the participation rate between
9.3 and 32.4 percent.
These estimates are comparable to the
T}TC numbers estimated by Katz (1998).
Using CPS and Department of Labor data
from the mid to late 1980s, he estimates
that nine percent of economically disadvantaged youth who were both eligible
and employed were claimed under the
credit.
As the current research highlights,
there are data limitations that prevent
comprehensive studies of participation.
It is impossible to identify the eligible
population using survey data, along a
number of dimensions, including cat25
26

egorical eligibility. However, the most
generous estimates suggest that fewer
than one-third of all estimated eligible
individuals participa te in the programs as
they ha ve been designed.
Influences
Firms that may benefit more from the
credits, because they hire more of the
targeted employees, are more likely to file
for the credit. The GAO (2002a) using IRS
data show that corporations in retail trade,
hotel and food services, and non-financia!
services accounted for approximately
three-quarters of total corporate WOTC
dollars for 1999. The GAO reports that
those knowledgeable about the WOTC,
including federal and state government
officials, report high utilization among
retail and service businesses because
of their high turnover and demand for
low-skilled workers (GAO, 2002a). 26 Likewise, Bishop and Kang (1991) find that
employers paying low wages, employing
low-skilled workers and offering nonsecure jobs were all significant determinants of using the TJTC.
The high costs of complying with the
credit requirements may also influence
utilization. For example, Hamersma (2003)
points to evidence that the minimumhours requirement may be a major reason
for the low participation in the WtW and
WOTC credits. Her evidence comes from
a GAO study, which showed that certified
employees are often not employed long
enough to meet the hours requirement to
be claimed by the employer (Hamersma,
2003). The persistent finding that larger
firms are more likely to participation in
these credits (GAO, 2002a; Bishop and
Montgomery, 1986; Bishop and Montgomery, 1993; Bishop and Kang, 1991) also
suggest that compliance costs are a large

This estimate is still on!y the potentially eligible because a firm must have tax liability to claim the credit.
There is mixed evidence on whether firms "chum" employees, i.e., hire them for the mínimum amount of
hours necessary to utilize the credit, befare releasing them (GAO, 2001a; Hamersma and Heinrich, 2004).
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influence on utilization. Bishop and Kang
(1991) specifically find that firms better
able to cover the fixed costs of participating because they have a personnel office or
are a multi-establishment firm all suggest
that compliance costs influence participation decisions.
Bishop and Kang (1991) find that the following indicators of low incremental cost
are significan! in determining use of the
TJTC: lower-than-average wages (so the
credit pays a larger percentage of the total
wage bill), having fired an employee in the
previous quarter, and being a non-union
employer.
Knowledge of the credit also seems
to be a factor in firms taking the credit,
although knowledge could clearly be endogenous to the benefit of the firm taking
the credit. Bishop and Montgomery (1986)
find higher participation rates among
employers who know of the credit. They
also find that government outreach in the
form of personal contact by a representative of a government agency or local business organization is positively correlated
with utilization. Employers who had
been contacted by an outreach program
were 63 percent more likely to participa te
in TJTC than those who knew about the
credit from another source, according to
estima tes conducted by the Departrnent of
Labor using a survey of 5,859 employers
in 28labor markets.
There is indirect evidence that the
potential for employee stigma could also
influence the participation rate in the employer-based tax credits. The issue is that
employees have to identify themselves to
employers as members of an at-risk group
that is certifiable for the credit and this
imposes a stigma cost on the employees
being hired (see a summary in DickertConlin and Holtz-Eakin (2000)).
27

Geographícally Targeted Tax Credíts

Description
There are two federal-leve! geographically targeted tax credits: Empowerment
Zones (EZ) and Renewal Community
(RC). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 established the EZ, and
the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of
2000 created the RC, which both provide
credits to individual or corporate employers based on the census tract location of
the employer and employees living in
the area. The goal of these credits is to
revitalize distressed urban and rural communities through increased employment
opportunities and wages for members of
targeted communities. Generally, the EZ
requires a minimum of 20- to 35-percent
poverty levels and 6.3-percent unemployment rates and the RC requires a
minimum of 20-percent poverty levels
and 9.45-percent unemployment rates
(GAO, 2004). The only condition on the
type of person hired for the firm is that
the employee needs to live within the
designated zone. A list of designated areas
is found at www.irs.gov and http: 1/www.
ezec.gov 1Communit/ ruralezec.htrnl. An
employer can determine its own and its
employees' eligibility through the Housing and Urban Development (www.hud.
gov 1crlocator) website or a toll-free
number (IRS, 2004g).
The EZ credit is for 20 percent of the
first $15,000 in wages, for a maximum of
$3,000, while the RC credit is for 15 percent of the first $10,000 for a maximum of
$1,500. The OMB (2005) estimates tax expenditures of $1.08 billion in tax revenue
from the EZ/EC27 and RC.
To file for these credits, a firm must fill
out form 8844, which involves reporting
wages paid to the qualified employee and

ECs are Enterprise Communities. They are geographically targeted areas that get a special allowance for
depreciation and sorne further tax preference on offering bonds. OMB does not break down this estímate
further. GAO (2002a) points out that the EZ/RC wage credit makes up the majority of the credit dollars.
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showing that the firm had sorne tax liability. 28 The actual paperwork is a page long
and the document has instructions about
how to check eligibility of an employee.
Several states also have credits available
based on the geographic location of employees' homes and where they do most
of their work. Most of these programs
work similar to the federal program, and
in fact use the same name as the federal
program. 29

cording to IRS officials the addresses
business owners list on tax forms do not
necessarily correspond with the location
of their business operations, but may be
a residence or the address where the business is incorporated. Second, the IRS form
used to claim the EZ and RC Employment
Credits does not require the taxpayer to
identify the EZ(s) or RC(s) where the business operations eligible for the credit are
located. (32-3)
This matching problem makes it prohibitively difficult to characterize the eligible
population for each credit by location, so
that meaningful participation rates are
not available.

Utilization

Estima tes
Tables 3 and 4 show that the utilization of the EZ and RC credits has grown
extensively since 1995. The introduction
of the RC in 2002 accompanied a dramatic
jump in the number and dollar-amount
of credits claimed by both individuals and
corporations. The geographically targeted
credits have no way of distinguishing if
credit dollars are claimed for disadvantaged employees in the region.
The GAO (1999) surveyed 2,400 employers in 1997 and found that 33 percent
of large urban businesses, 70 percent of
small urban businesses, and 47 percent
of rural businesses indicated that they
did not use any of the tax advantages of
the EZ credit, including the wage credit,
thatyear.
The IRS can identify the number of
firms claiming the credit; however, finding
the number of firms eligible to claim the
credit is not easy. The GAO (2004) cites the
following matching problem.

Influences
The GAO (1999) survey found that employers who did not use the tax incentives
claimed that they either did not know
about them (40 percent), did not qualify
for them because the employees did not
live in an EZ or were family members (35
percent), did not have tax liability (five
percent), or found them too complicated
to use (eight percent). The remaining
respondents either did not answer the
question or gave other reasons.
Like the categorically targeted tax credits, there is evidence that employer size
is positively correlated with using these
geographically targeted credits, perhaps
because the economies of scale lower
the cost of complying. The GAO (1999,
2004), in a 1997 survey of 2,400 employers in the nine original Empowerment
Zones, 30 finds that large urban employers were more likely than small urban
employers to use the Empowerment Zone
wage credit. Bershadker and Brashares

[A]ccording to IRS officials, the agency
cannot reliably link businesses claiming
the employment credit with specific
EZs or RCs due to two factors. First, ac28
29

30

This is a little more complicated for carry-forward credits used for previous years.
GAO (2004) listsAlaska, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Wyoming as the only states that do not ha ve sorne sor! of geographically based credit for employers. Many of these states offer special credits for hiring or training employees in certain industries or other
job-related credits that are not based on geographic location of employees.
These include Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia /Camden, New York, the Kentucky Highlands,
the Mississippi Mid-Delta, and the Rio Grande Valley in Texas.

770

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Federal lncome Tax Credits for Low-lncome Familias

the dollar amount of their credits. What
little we know about the incentives to
participation comes from a single study on
a Georgia state program. Lack of data on
eligible employees in an area and actual
hires is the primary source of poor utilization estima tes.

(2000), using 1996 and 1997 IRS tax
form data, show that among individuals
claiming the credit, 22 percent have AGI
over $500,000, but this represents over
65 percent of the total amount of claims.
Among corporations claiming the credit,
18 percent of the corporate returns had
assets over $100 million, and these 18
percent represent 52 percent of the dollar
amount claimed.
The benefits may be largest to firms that
are most likely to employ persons in these
designated areas, and Bershadker and
Brashares (2000) found that 61 percent of
claiming firms report that their business
is in manufacturing.
Faulk (2001) examines the factors influencing a firm's decision to participate
in Georgia's EZ program, the Job's Tax
Credit GTC). The JTC, like the EZ credit,
provides a tax credit to firms based on
their county of location. 31 The JTC, however, is only available for firms in certain
industries, is based on the number of jobs
created by the firm (instead of wages),
and counts toward state lax liability.
Using corporate income tax returns of
firms that were eligible to take the credit
and the Georgia Department of Labor's
ES202 data to identify which ones actually
took the credit, Faulk (2001) finds a high
participation rate of 70 of the 151 firms in
the sample. The analysis finds that the following were significant in determining if a
firm claims the credit: having tax liability,
previously taking the credit, employing
more workers, the number of eligible jobs
credited, being headquartered in Georgia,
and being a "start up" firm. The results
suggest that a lack of information and a
small credit amount are the primary reasons why the credit is not taken.
In summary, almost nothing is known
about the participation in geographically targeted EZ programs, except for the
number of firms claiming the credit and
31

UTILIZATION OF INCOME TAX
CREDITS RELATIVE TO SOCIAL
INSURANCE PROGRAMS

Historically, social goals targeted at
low-income individuals were more likely
to be met through expenditure programs.
Although the design and incentives may
be quite different, the literature on utilization of these programs may shed light on
what influences take-up of tax credits.
In sorne cases, the tax credits may be
aimed at replacing welfare payments, so
a clear understanding of the decisions to
participate in these spending programs
may be useful.
Given that, historically, most social
insurance programs for low-income individuals were entitlement programs designed to provide short-term aid, the focus
in the literature measuring participation
is almost entirely on non-participation
by eligible persons, rather than on how
program design leaves sorne ineligible.
Yet, like the tax credits, estimates of participation in social spending programs vary
widely both across programs and across
eligible subpopulations (Currie, 2004).
One caveat to the work on participation
is consistent with the tax credit research:
data. Currie (2004) notes that survey data
provide imprecise measures of the eligible
population because of a lack of precise
information about key variables such as
assets, earnings or disability status. This,
in, turn makes it difficult to estímate
eligibility and utilization in spending
programs.

County characteristics, such as unernployrnent rate, average rnanufacturing wage, poverty rate, and percapita
incorne, determine the credit levels.
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Often cited in the literature on utilization of public programs are stigma,
transaction costs, and lack of information, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive explanations. Although
the application and utilization systems
in spending programs have the potential
to play a larger role in participation decisions, relative to tax credits, there is little
empirical evidence that stigma does play
a large role. Currie (2004) notes that there
was no observable change in food-stamp
participation rates after the introduction
of electronic debit cards, which presumably would reduce the stigma associated
with program participation.
However, there is a great deal of
evidence that transaction costs are an
important influence in the decision of
those eligible to participate. Specifically,
researchers find that when transactions
costs are lowered, through means of less
frequent recertification periods (Kabbani

For example, participation tends to be
counter cyclical, with higher participation
when the economy is doing poorly (Blank
and Wallace, 1999; Council of Economic
Advisors, 1999; Currie and Grogger, 2001;
Figlio and Ziliak, 1999; Ziliak et al., 2003).
Blankand Ruggles (1996) find that a lower
earnings potential dueto lower education
and higher numbers of children is associated with higher participation.
Overall, there is a tendency in the
welfare literature to focus much more
on the dynamic utilization of the programs (see Moffitt (1992) and Blank and
Ruggles (1996)). Perhaps this is a function of the view that spending programs
are temporary safety nets, rather than
long-term systems of support. The existing work on the dynamic use of tax
credits, including work by Altshuler
and Schwartz (1996), Dowd (2005) and
Horowitz (2005), highlights the severe
data constraints facing researchers on

and Wilde, 2003), links with other spend-

this topic, but also suggests a productive

ing programs (Ziliak, Gunderson and
Figlio, 2003), and business-community
involvement (Currie, 2004), participation
is higher. For spending programs, an
obvious business-community involvement comes from, for example, health
care providers seeking reimbursement
for treatment. While, in the tax-credit
system, the links are direct in the case of
employer-based tax credits, they are indirect in the case of tax preparation firms.
There is sorne evidence that the lack
of information may result in a lack
of participation (see, for example, the
Daponte, Osborne, Sanders and Taylor
(1999) food-stamp study). However,
Currie (2004) concludes that this reason
may be more important in smaller programs than in larger ones.
There is also evidence that when benefits are higher, participation is higher.
Beca use spending programs are traditionally not tied to work, these links between
characteristics and higher benefits are
often the opposite of those for tax credits.

avenue for future research.
WHAT SHOULD THE UTILIZATION
LOOK LIKE ANO HOW CAN WE GET
THERE?

Until now, this paper has provided a
positive analysis of the utilization of tax
credits among low-income individuals.
The question of what utilization among
low-income individuals should look
like remains. The answer to this question
depends, in part, on the goal of the tax
credits. Assuming the goal is to redistribute income and/ or encourage behavior
such as working and savings with the
mínima! possible distortions, we proceed
with sorne thoughts on what utilization
should look like.
Who?

Presumably, the families with poor
labor force participation records and
those with long histories of welfare par772
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ticipation stand to gain the most from
income transfers within the income-tax
system. Utilized credits have obvious
private and, potentially, social benefits.
For example, credits tied to earnings or
direct human capital investments, such as
education, may raise the utility of the recipient through higher income and greater
self-sufficiency, but may also positively
affect society by reducing dependency on
government funded transfer programs,
raising civic responsibility, increasing tax
revenues, and producing gains in labor
productivity and knowledge. 32 Likewise,
the utilization of credits that subsidize
child-care expenses or encourage savings
not only raises the disposable income
of the recipients, but may again reduce
dependency on government-funded programs such as welfare or social security.
Child-care and savings credits may also
have the potential to mitigate market
failures arising from asymmetric information such as the quality of child care
or the need for income in old age, which
could be efficiency-improving activities
(Blau, 2003). Subsidizing child care may
also benefit society by helping to produce
more productive adults, assuming that
more expensive child care is correlated
with higher-quality child care (Gentry
and Hagy, 1995).

ways of encouraging utilization, while
addressing obvious tradeoffs in doing
so.

Well-Targeted
Utilization should be well-targeted.
Obviously, for low-income individuals to
utilize tax credits aimed at accomplishing
social policy, they must be eligible for the
credit. On the individual tax side, nonrefundable tax credits will not reach the
lowest-income individuals, who pay little
or no federal income taxes. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the EITC, which is the only
fully refundable credit in the individual
tax code, has the highest estima tes of program participation of any tax credit aimed
at low-income taxpayers. The tradeoff to
making a program more well-targeted
at low-income individuals by allowing
refundability is the cost of the program
or resistance to using the tax system to
accomplish social goals (Burman, 2003;
Toder, 2000).
At higher incomes, there are also tradeoffs in keeping the credits well-targeted.
High marginal tax rates that phase out
eligibility restrict credits to low-income
individuals, which has the potential to
discourage work.
In an effort to keep the credits welltargeted, many of the tax credits place
strict categorical requirements on the
taxpayers. For example, the education
credits restrict the type of spending that
qualifies for the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credit, and the Saver's Credit limits
the credit value for those who received
distributions from their retirement accounts. Employers face strict requirements
about who they can hire and how long
those employees must work to qualify for
the employer-based credits. The tradeoff
is that many individuals and employers
do not use the credits because they do

How?

The question of how we should encourage utilization of tax credits brings us
unavoidably to a discussion of tradeoffs.
For example, policies that make the
credits more accessible to the most needy
individuals are expensive. In sorne cases,
the particularly well-targeted credits
come at the expense of making compliance with the program prohibitively
costly. The following discussion suggests
32

Heckman, Lochner and Cossa (2003) show the potential for the EITC to raise the human capital of !hose who
would otherwise not work, but lower the human capital investment of low-skilled individuals who choose
work over human capital investment dueto the EITC.
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not meet the strict requirements. The participation rate in employer-based credits,
such as the WOTC and WtW credits, are
particularly low, perhaps in part due
to these categorical restrictions. Even a
highly utilized program like the EITC
requires earned income, which implies
that the program will not be used by those
who are unable to work dueto disability
or other factors.
There is the possibility that tax credits
are poorly targeted beca use of the timing
of the encouraged behavior and the tax
credit. If the goal is to increase utilization,
the timing of tax credits may be a limitation. Specifically, liquidity constraints
may prevent individuals from engaging
in the economic behavior that qualifies
for a credit. For example, the educational
tax credits provide reimbursement for
college expenses in a lump-sum benefit,
significantly after those expenses were
incurred. The same is true for the childand dependent-care credit. As a result,
those who may be in most need of assistance do not have the means to engage
in the behavior because the program
is administered through the tax system
rather than through a federal agency.
In contrast, there are fewer transaction
costs associated with simply filing taxes
once a year, rather than more frequently.
In another sense, tax programs can provide a superior measurement of income
because income is calculated on an annual basis rather than over a shorter time
period. Thus, tax programs may be able to
differentiate between a more permanent
low-income period and a temporary
one.

Saver's Credit, and the TJTC suggests
that many individuals and firms do no
not even know the programs exist. Even
among individuals using credits, utilization could be more effective if taxpayers
were more informed. For example, evidence on education credits suggests that
individuals do not know which credits
provide them with the largest benefits
(GAO, 2005).
One simplifying measure might include
bundling credits together. Currie (2004)
finds evidence that when applications
for multiple welfare programs are integrated, take-up among all those eligible
may well increase. Currie (2004) also finds
that there are spillover effects in utilization between programs. There have been
multiple calls or proposals for bundling
tax credits to simplify the process. Cherry
and Sawicky (2000), Ellwood and Liebman
(2000), and Carasso, Rohaly, and Steuerle
(2003) are a few of the recent proposals
to either reform the EITC in combination
with the dependent exemption and/ or the
Child Tax Credit.
A tradeoff to making the credits more
accessible through refundability, reduction in categorical requirements, and
increasing simplicity of filing is the potentia! for increased non-compliance, either
intentional or non-intentional.
CONCLUSION

There is much work that needs to
be done in understanding how these
tax programs are utilized, particularly
if social programs continue to be provided through the tax system rather than
through direct programs. It will be especially important to expand data collection
efforts to get data needed to accurately
assess participation.
With the existing data, it appears that
utilization is by far the largest for the
EITC, possibly because it is the oldest of
these programs, the only refundable pro-

Simple
To increase the utilization of these
tax credits, they should be simple to
claim, conditional on eligibility. This ineludes information about the existence of
the credits and about how to actually
file the credit. Evidence on the EITC, the
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APPENDIX TABLE lA
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CREDITS

a.
(1)

TaxProgram

Participation Estimates

Data Used

Factors lnlluencing Partiápation

Eamed Income Tax Credit, an individual
tax credit targeted at low-income workers.

Blumenthal, Erard and Ho (2005)

Fajnzylber (2004)

Hill, Hotz, Mullin and Scholz (1999)

8
69.4-74.3%

64%

42-84%

~
......

Blumenthal et al. estimated the number of eligible households from
either 1988 IRS TCMPPhase Ill for tax filers and the 1988 IRS TCMP
Phase IX Nonfiler Survey for tax nonfilers. EITC claims were based
on IRS data on the number of 1988 EITC claims.
Fajnzylber estimated the number of EITC-eligible units based on
individuals in the AFOC / TANF program between 1993 and 1999 in
CaWomia, from Department of Soáal Services MediCal Eligibility
Data, who had positive eamings, as reported to Califomia's Unemployment lnsurance Program. The number of EITC claims was based
on a match performed by Callfomia's Franchise Tax Board.
Hill et al. use data from the California Work Pays Demonstration
Project (CWPDP) for the number of AFOC assistance units from
tour counties--Alameda, Los Angeles, San Bemardino and San
Joaquin-and quarterly wage and salary information from the state's
unemployment insurance records for the number of EITC-eligible

Factors associated w:ith increasing participa!ion: larger
benefits.

Hirasuna and Stinson (2005)

Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2005)

N/ A

N/ A

Hirasuna and Stinson estima te the number of eligible claimants by
merging data from the state of Minnesota's Department of Human
Services, Department of Economic Security and Department of
Revenue for the period 1995 to 1999. The number of actual claims
was based on tax data from the Department of Revenue.
Hirasuna and Stinson estima te their model based on data from the
state of Minnesota for the period 1995 through 1999. Data from
the Department of Human Services, Department of Revenue, and
Department of Economic Security were merged with data from Accountability Minnesota and the AARP on free tax preparation si tes.

Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches estimated participation based on 1988
through 1999 IRS tax retum data.

g;l
X

¡:¡¡

Factors associated with increasing participation: tax
preparation services; maximum benefit; improved

a.

county economic conditions; black; Hispanic. Factors
associated with decreasing participation: single parent;

Q

~

young children.

r

Factors increasing participation: use o f a paid preparer;

n

recent entrants to welfare; two-parent households.

~:;-

o
3
(1)
"T1

lll

~

returns for the years 1993 and 1994.
61.0-68.8%

3(1)

o

individuals. EITC credits claimed comes from federal income tax

Hirasuna and Stinson (2004)

ª-

:;-

¡¡¡·
en
Factors associated with increasing participation: resid-

ing in a suburban county; size of maximum credit;
Asian Americans; older parents. Factors assodated
with decreasing participation: residing in a rural
county; less than a high school education.

Factors increasing participation: free tax preparation
sites in high-poverty areas; size of credit; income range

of credit; female head; married. Factors decreasing
participation: residing in surburban area; Hispanic;
American Indian; less than a high school education;
family size; age of household head.
Factors associated with increasing participation:

electronic filing.
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APPENDIX TABLE lA (CONTINUED)
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CREDITS
Tax Program

Participation Estimates

Factors Influencing Participation

Data Used

Scholz (1994)

75-131%

Scho lz used the 1990 SIPP, matched to tax retums, fo r the number
of EITC-eligible tax units. For the number of EITC claims, Scholz
used four different sources: 1) Creen Book estima tes, 2) Green Book
estimates, adjusted by the 1988 1RS Taxpaye r Compliance Meas urement Program (TCMP), 3) IRS claims, and 4) 1990 SIPP self-reported
information on participation in the EITC. Scholz a lso did a calculation
adjusting the number of EITC-<!Iigible tax units by including those
units that filed a 1040EZ and using lRS data to estimate the number
ofclaims.

Factors associated with increasing participation: la rger
benefits; married; residing in state with an income
tax. Factors associated with decreasing participation:
self--employment income; receipt of public assistance;
larger famil y size; male; Hispanic; education; working
in priva te household occu pations.

U .S. GAO (2001)

75%

The GAO used the 2000 March CPS to estima te the number of
EITC-<>ligible recipients. The number of EITC claims was based on
1999IRS data.

Factors associated with increasing participation: one or
two qualifying children.

U .S. lnterna l Revenue Service (2002)

64.2-73.5%

The lRS used 1997 CPS data matched to tax retums for the numbe r of
EITC-eligible units. lRS tax data was used to calculate the number of
EITC claims. The IRS also used 1997 SIPP to estima te the number of
EITC-<!ligible units.

Factors associated with increasing participation:
income; credit size. Factors associated with decreasing
participation: credit; residing in South or West region;
residing in California, New York, Texas, or Florida;
no qualifying children; not completing a high school
educa tion; Hispanic; recei pt of public assistance.

78%

Hoblitze ll and Smith estima te the number of ed ucation credit claims
in the University of California system based on a survey. The number
of eligible survey respondents is based on survey data matched to
administrative data.

N/A

Long estimated the number of educa tional tax credits based on
self-reported use in the 1999-2000 NPSAS. The number of eligible
students eligible for the educa tional tax credits was based on the
1999-2000 NPSAS.

Factors associated with increasing participation: female
students; white students; married filers; parents wi th
college experience. Factors associated with decreasing participa tion: graduate students that relied less on
federa l stud e nt a id programs.

cil
N
Educational Tax Credits, tax credits
targeted a t families with college
stud ents
Hoblitzell and Smith (2001)

Long(2004)

27.3-29.4%
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Child and Dependen! Care Credit,

CD

a tax credit targeted at assisting

c.

parents with child ca re expenses
while working

~
:J
()

Altshuler and Schwartz. (1996)

Gentry and Hagy (1996)

CD

17.8%

15.7-29.9%

Altshuler and Schwartz used the University of Michigan panel of tax
retum data for years 1979-1988. The number of eligible claimants
is constructed by the number of retums claiming a dependen t. The
number of claimants is the number of retums claiming the credit.

NIA

Gentry and Hagy utilize the 1989 Child Care Survey to estimate
participation rates by dividing the numbe r of families that reported
claiming the credit by the number of families with children under the
age of 13 (the number of e ligible recipients). They also estima te participation based on 1989 SOl data. In the SOl estimates, the nume rater is the number of retums claiming the credit and the denominator
is the number of returns claiming a dependen t.

Factors associa ted with increased participation include

()

younger children, higher levels of education for the
mother, and use of child ca re centers o r family d ay ca re
centers. Factors associated with decreased participation
include larger family size.

Cil
c.

o
3

CD

~
X
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~

r
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APPENDIX TABLE 2A
EMPLOYER CLAIMED INCOME TAX CREDITS
TaxProgram

Data Used

Participation Estimates

Factors lnfluencing Participation

CategoricaUy Targeted Employer
Claimed Tax Credits
Hamersma (2003)

U.S GAO (2002)

WOTC:
0.2-3.3% All Eligible, 0.3-16.6% New
Hires Only. WOTC & WtW: 0.9-5.7% All
Eligible, 2.3-32.4% New Hires Only.

Department of Labor Certifications and SIPP

1/ 750 corporations and 1/3450 individ-

IRS Statistics of lncome sample for 1999

uals with a business affiliation reported

Larger Firms, corporations in retail trade, hotel and food
services, and non-financia) services.

the WOTC on their retums in 1999.
Montgomery (1986)

2.25% of firms surveyed participated in
thel]TC.

Department of Labor survey of 5,859 employers in 28
labor markets

Size of establishment, flexibility in firing employees,
non-union firms, learning about the credit from a
govemment representative, past participation, unskilled

work available conditional on knowledge of the credit.

~

Bishop and Montgomery (1993)

The total sample had a participation
cate between 2.7 and 4.3%. Participation rates weighted by firm size range

Surveys conducted by lnstitute for Research on Poverty

Not Discussed

and National Center for Research in Vocational Educa-

tion of 3,412 employers.

between 14.6% and 21.3% for the 1JTC.
Bishop and Kang (1991)

10% of eligible youth hired are claimed
underl]TC.

1982 survey by the National Center for Research in

Pre--1981: Offering new employees more than standard

Vocational Education conducted by Gallup Organization

training, offering less specific training, low capital investment per worker, lower than average wage rates, having

of emp loyers.

fired an employee in 4th quarter 1979. After 1981: Being
non-union, having higher capital investments per em-

ployee, not having fired an employee in 4th quarter 1979.
Katz (1998)

9% of economically disadvantaged

Department of Labor certifications, unpublished tabula-

Regulatory Burden, lack of support by administering

youth who were both eligible and
employed were daimed under the l]TC.

tions from U.S House of Representa ti ves. CPS was used
to calcula te the popu1ation of economically disadvan-

agencies, stigma for targeted workers.

~

6

z)>
r

~

taged youth.

X

Geographically Targeted Tax
Credits
U.S GAO (2004)

z

c....

Total numbers of EZ wage credits are
reported; no participation rate is given.

IRS's Statistics of Income databases of corporate and
individual tax returns for 1995 through 2001. (Samples
of tax retums.)

Cited results of survey from 1999 GAO report.
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U.S GAO (1999)

Bershadker and Brashares (2000)

According to the survey response, 42%
of the large urban businesses, 6% of
the small urban businesses, and 32% of
the rural businesses used the EZ wage
credit.

GAO's own mailed survey to 2,400 businesses in the nine The survey differentiated by size of firm and urban vs.
rural dassification. Knowledge of the credit as well as
original empowerment zones.
having eligible employees also were major factors of

Numbers of filers and credit dollar

A special extract of IRS Individual Master File is used
as well as the Empowerment Zone Supplement to the
Corporate SOl sarnple.

Claimants are characterized by AGI for individuals and

Georgia Departrnent of Labor ES202 data identifies
which firms took the credit. Corporate income tax
returns show firms that were eligible to take the credit.

Probability of participation increased with: tax liability,
decreased size of firm, if the firm had previously taken
the credit, and if the number of jobs credited increased.
Participation decreased with: larger firms, firms not headquartered in Georgia, and firms that were start-ups.

amounts are given.

Faulk (2001)

46.35% (70/151) of eligible firms took
Georgia's Job Tax Credit.

respondents who gave reasons for not using the credit.
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